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Abstract 
Cloud security is a system engineering problem. A common approach to address the problem is to 
adapt existing Trusted Network Connection (TNC) framework in the cloud environment, which can be 
used to assess and verify end clients’ system state. However, TNC cannot be applied to network 
equipment attached to the cloud computing environment directly. To allow the network devices to 
access the trusted network devices safely and reliably, we first developed a Trusted Network 
Equipment Access Authentication Protocol (TNEAAP). We use the BAN logic system to prove that 
TNEAAP is secure and credible. We then configure the protocol in an attack detection mode to 
experimentally show that the protocol can withstand attacks in the real network. Experiment results 
show that all the nine goals that decide the protocol’s security have been achieved. 
Keywords: Trusted network equipment; authentication; security protocol; BAN logic; attack detection 
model 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing environment is emerging as a key platform supporting data-intensive 
processing and big data analysis in information technology. The advantages of convenience, 
economy, and high extensibility draw the attention of more and more researchers and practitioners. 
However, cloud computing is just like a double-edged sword, it brings us great convenience, and 
at the same time, it also carries additional problems, such as performance, reliability, 
trustworthiness, and security [1-2]. With the popularity of cloud computing, the significance of 
security issues is gradually increasing, and it has become an important factor to restrict cloud 
applications. The solution of cloud security is complex. A common approach is to adapt existing 
Trusted Network Connection (TNC) [3] solutions to the cloud computing paradigm. The basic 
objective of TNC from the perspective of endpoint integrity is to deny those network accesses to 
endpoints that do not meet certain minimum security criteria [4-6]. In the network access control 
research, many related studies have been conducted in the field of improving network connection 
protocol and improving TNC architecture. 
1.1 Trusted network connection protocol 
Luo et al. [7] followed the TNC framework to design an improved network access control 
system, T-NAC, which emphasized the platform authentication and communication security. A 
network access control system based on the network processor platform IXP2400 was designed. 
Latze [8] proposed a strong bidirectional authentication protocol, which was based on TPM 
(Trusted Platform Module) and EAP-TLS authentication method. Latze [9] later proposed a new 
authentication protocol: EAP-TPM. The first EAP-TPM system was built in Switzerland. Then 
Latze [10] improved EAP-TPM protocol based on zero-authentication. However, these protocols 
did not address the problem of Man-in-the-middle attacks. Wang et al. [11] analyzed the D-H 
(Diffie-Hellman) keys exchange protocol, and proposed a digital signature and signature 
verification end-to-end protocol to solve the problem of Man-in-the-middle attacks. Yu [12] 
studied the platform anonymous identity management defects of TNC and proposed a new method 
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to improve these impairments. The new trusted certification generation method was based on ID 
(Identity) encryption mechanism and improved DAA (Direct Anonymous Attestation) protocol. 
The protocol was more flexible and security to manage identity on terminal platforms. 
1.2 Trusted access model  
To make the trusted network access mechanism more practicable, researchers proposed 
different solutions that focused on TNC architecture. Jungbauer [13] proposed a method to 
determine the integrity of endpoints which served as a basis for trustworthy communication. The 
model did not require specific hardware such as TPM (Trusted Platform Module) or special 
operating system structure. It also supported exiting network infrastructures. Rehbock [14] 
proposed a protocol stack that enabled the use of TNC in web-based environments and changed 
the TNC architecture to ensure additional security. The potential use of the TPM functionality 
within the TNC framework and experiences were given by Bente [15] and Heldenin [16], 
respectively. They further defined a conceptual model for client-side policies that was based upon 
TNC’s IF-M (Interface-Measurement) protocol and showed that many policies can be enforced by 
extending the standard TNC framework [17]. Tang et al. [18] proposed a trusted network model 
based on the TPM, through which a trusted chain from terminals to network was established. 
Zhang [19] designed a TNC security model based on UCF (Universally Composable Framework) 
that can be extended to describe more security properties, such as anonymity. The model can be 
applied to analyze more protocols in the TNC architecture. 
Cloud security is a system engineering problem. It requires additional security features not 
only for the endpoint security techniques, but also for the switches and routers, which are the core 
network equipment of Ethernet. In general, the existing TNC framework can be used to assess and 
verify end clients’ system state, but cannot be applied to network equipment directly. There are 
certain differences between network equipment and the endpoints to join in a network. Network 
equipment undertakes forwarding packets within routing or switching function in the network. 
They are service providers, whereas, endpoints use network only, and they are service clients. If 
accessed network equipments failure, it will affect the part of the cloud network, whereas, a failure 
endpoint only affects itself. Thus, network equipment pays more attention on trusted boot up 
process and trusted network services than terminals do. Trusted boot up process ensures network 
equipments static trust, trusted network service ensures its dynamic trust. 
On the other hand, existing authentication protocols of network equipment have various 
weaknesses and are difficult to be applied in the trusted network. For example, PAP (Password 
Authentication Protocol) is often used in router access authentication. However, PAP is not a 
strong and effective method of authentication. The password is transported in plain text. CHAP 
(Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol) [20] is another router authentication protocol. The 
protocol is more secure than PAP. In CHAP, (1) the remote access server sends a challenge to the 
remote client that consists of a session ID and an arbitrary challenge string. (2) The remote client 
must return the user name and a Message Digest 4 (MD4) hash of the challenge string, the session 
ID, and the MD4-hashed password. (3) The authenticator checks the response against its own 
calculation of the expected hash value. If the values match, the authentication is acknowledged; 
otherwise the connection SHOULD be terminated. (4) At random intervals, the authenticator sends 
a new challenge to the peer, and repeats steps 1 to 3. However, CHAP [21] also has its weaknesses: 
(1) In the authentication server, the user’s password was stored in plain text, which provided 
opportunities for intruders to obtain a user’s password. (2) The protocol supports one-way 
authentication only. (3) The user password in CHAP is shared between two communication parties, 
and thus keys distribution and updating can cause inconsistency problems. (4) If a user used a 
simple password, the protocol could not prevent the dictionary attack. (5) In order to prevent the 
insertion channel attacks, the authentication server must reprint certification periodically. If the 
cycle time interval is too long, it can give the intruder opportunities.  
This paper presents a network device access authentication protocol. In our protocol, in 
addition to equipment’s platform authentication, the administrator also should be authenticated. 
The identification authentication process is actually the binding administrator to the trusted 
platform, to ensure the administrator is legal on trusted platform. Our protocol is to avoid 
malicious behavior from illegal administrator login trusted platform or legitimate user login illegal 
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platform. The authentication protocol achieves these targets: safety, credibility, and low overhead. 
The security of the protocol is analyzed by a formalization method based on BAN 
(Burrows-Abadi-Needham) logic, which can reveals vulnerabilities and redundancy [22]. The 
protocol processes are formalized with HLPSL (High-Level Protocol Specification Language) 
[23]. The formalization of the protocol processes is tested by plugging into an attacking model of 
the safety testing tool to check whether the protocol is secure or not. 
In the rest of the paper, section 2 shows the design of the authentication method for the 
trusted network devices to join in the network. Section 3 formalizes our protocol by BAN logic for 
safety analysis. Section 4 presents the experiment, which uses the attack model to attack the 
protocol and to demonstrate that protocol is secure. Section 5 gives the network equipment 
performance evaluation. We conclude the paper in section 6. 
2. DESIGN OF THE AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed trusted network equipment access authentication protocol 
(TNEAAP) consists of three major components: requester, boundary network equipment, and 
network authentication management server. 
1) Requester(R): it is a piece of network equipment, in which a Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) is embedded. The Requester sends the metric information to the authentication 
management server when it wants to be a member of the network.  
2) Boundary network equipment (BNE): it is a strategy execution device that controls the 
requester to access the network. 
3) Network authentication management server (NAMS): it is a decision builder that 
manages network equipment and an administrator in the trusted network. 
 
 Fig. 1 TNEAAP architecture 
 
2.1 Authentication Process 
The proposed authentication process of TNEAAP is divided into the following three steps: 
(1) Issuing of trusted certification: A requester R registers itself to the trusted certificate server, as 
shown in Fig.1, and then R applies for a trusted certificate from the server. R sends hardware 
information, software information, operating system version, and public key of R to the 
trusted certificate server. The server verifies information. If it is correct, the server will 
generate a trusted certificate and issue it to R. 
(2) Platform authentication: This step performs the equipment platform authentication. R sends the 
Storage Measurement Log (SML) to the NAMS. NAMS validates whether SML accords with 
the trusted metric accessing rules. If information is certified by NAMS, the requester will be 
allowed to join into the network.  
(3) Administrator authentication: When an administrator logs onto the network device (requester 
NAMS
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R), R sends the administrator information to NAMS, which checks whether the administrator 
is legal or not. 
 In this paper, we do not discuss the trusted certificate server’s strategy, and we focus on the 
security issues of the proposed authentication protocol. 
2.2 Formalization of TNEAAP 
The foregoing platform authentication and administrator authentication steps of TNEAAP are 
shown in Fig. 2, which elaborates the authentication process. The steps of the process listed in the 
figure are explained as follows. 
 
. 
Platform 
Authenticatio
n
Platform 
Authenticatio
n
User Identity 
Authenticatio
n
User Identity 
Authenticatio
n
R NAMS
i) Authentication Request: 
{plat_ID||NAMS}R
-1
ii) Authentication Random Number:
 {nonceNAMS||Rpub}NAMS
-1
iii) Platform Authentication Information:
{{{PCR||nonceNAMS}R
-1
||SML||plat_ID}NAMSpub}R
-1
iv)The Authentication Pass:
 {{Rsucc}R
-1
}NAMS
-1
v) User Identity Authentication Request:
 {SID||plat_ID||user_ID}R
-1
vi) Session Key Random Number: 
{{nonceNAMS-SK}Rpub||SID}NAMS
-1
vii) User Identity Information: 
{{nonceR-SK}NAMSpub||SID||CMAC||{user_ID||user_PWD}SK}R
-1
viii) The Authentication Pass: 
{{R-NAMSsucc}SK}NAMS
-1
 
Fig. 2 Platform authentication and administrator authentication of TNEAAP 
(1) Platform authentication 
 i) R sends a request to NAMS. R signs the NAMS’s public key NAMSpub and R’s platform 
identity plat_ID by applying the private key of R (R
-1
), and R sends the signed message to the 
server NAMS. 
     1}||_{:  RNAMSIDplatNAMSR pub        (1) 
 ii) NAMS sends a random number to R. In the step (i), NAMS has obtained R’s ID and 
NAMSpub, which means that R trusts NAMS. Then NAMS generates a random number 
nonceNAMS. NAMS sends nonceNAMS and Rpub signed by the private key of NAMS (NAMS
-1
) to R, 
where Rpub is the public key of R. 
     1}||{:  NAMSRnonceRNAMS pubNAMS        (2) 
iii) R sends a platform authentication message to NAMS. R obtains the random number 
nonceNAMS and Rpub, which indicates that NAMS knows the public key of R. The hash digest of 
boot up processes is stored in PCR (Platform Configuration Register), which cannot be deleted or 
modified. PCR’s value and nonceNAMS are signed by R’s private key R
-1
, that is, N = (PCR, 
nonceNAMS)R
-1
. R sends N, SML, and plat_ID signed by R
-1
 to NAMS.  
     11 }}_||||}||{{{:  RNAMSIDplatSMLRnoncePCRNAMSR pubNAMS   (3) 
 iv) NAMS sends an acknowledgement message to R. NAMS unpacks the received message 
by Rpub and NAMS
-1
, obtains the PCR’s value. NAMS compares the hash digest of SML with 
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PCR’s value. If the result is consistent, SML is not tampered. Then NAMS considers the boot up 
process is trusted. NAMS sends ACK (Acknowledgement) of platform authentication success to R 
and allows R to access network.  
     1:{{ } }pubNAMS R ACK R NAMS
         (4) 
(2) Administrator authentication (requires negotiation session key) 
 v) R sends a user authentication request to NAMS. The request includes plat_ID, username 
(user_ID), and the current session identifier (SID). R sends the request signed by R
-1
 to NAMS. 
     1}_||_||{:  RIDuserIDplatSIDNAMSR      (5) 
 vi) NAMS generates and sends a session key random number to R. NAMS determines 
whether the user is legal and valid through the plat_ID and user_ID. If the information is valid, 
NAMS generates a session key random number nonceNAMS-SK and encrypts it by Rpub. NAMS 
signs the cryptograph and SID, then sends this signature information to R.      
    1}||}{:  NAMSSIDRnonceRNAMS pubSKNAMS       (6) 
vii) R sends user identity information to NAMS. R decrypts SID by the public key of NAMS 
and the random number nonceNAMS-SK using its own private key. Then, R generates a new random 
number nonceR-SK and message authentication codes CMAC, 1 ( , )MAC SK NAMS SKC HMAC SHA nonce SID  , 
which ensures information integrity. R uses the pseudo-random number generation function PRGF 
to calculate this session key SK using the nonceR-SK, nonceNAMS-SK and the current session 
identifier SID. SK’s calculation equation is ( , , )
NAMS SK R SK
SK PRGF nonce nonce SID
 
 . R 
encrypts the username user_ID, user password user_PWD, and trusted platform authentication 
certificate Rcer by SK. R’s private key signs this cryptograph, pubSKR
NAMSnonce }{  , SID and 
CMAC, sends this signature information to NAMS. 
     
1}}||_||_{||
||||}{{:


RSKRPWDuserIDuser
CSIDNAMSnonceNAMSR
cer
MACpubSKR       (7) 
viii) NAMS sends an acknowledgement message to R. NAMS
-1
 decrypts 
pubSKR NAMSnonce }{  . NAMS receives the random number nonceR-SK. NAMS calculates the 
session key SK using the two existing random numbers of session and the current session 
identifier SID. Then { _ || _ || }
cer
user ID user PWD R SK
 
is decrypted by the session key SK. NAMS 
can obtains the user name and password, compares the user information with the user registration 
information in NAMS. If the user is legal, NAMS sends ACK’ acknowledgement of administrator 
authentication success to R and allows the R to access the trusted network with the administrator 
login. The certification process is completed with the following action: 
   1:{{ } }NAMS R ACK SK NAMS         (8) 
3. TNEAAP FORMALIZATION ANALYSIS 
According to BAN logic analysis method and the characteristics of TNEAAP, we analyze whether 
the authentication protocol is secure or not. 
3.1 Analysis Procedure 
    The analysis procedure is as follows: 
1) According to BAN logic representation, the authentication protocol is formalized; 
2) The security goals of the protocol are determined. The assumptions are initialized. The security 
goals and initial assumptions are described by logical symbols; 
3) The proof of security is to show that if the initial assumptions are applied to the messages of the 
protocol, and all of the security goals can be inferred from the messages; 
4) In the reasoning process, the protocol defects and redundancy can be detected. 
    The authentication protocol is formalized as equation (1) to equation (8), and the other 
analysis steps are as follows. 
 6 
 
3.2 Security Targets 
This section discusses the general BAN logic forms of security objectives. The primary goal is 
|A X  and |B X . The ultimate goal is | |A B X   and | |B A X  . 
The initialization assumption is the primary goal in BAN. Thus, the security goals can be 
defined as the following seven goals: 
     | | | pub
R
R NAMS R             (9) 
     | | | pub
NAMS
NAMS R NAMS          (10) 
     | |NAMS R PCR            (11) 
     | |R NAMS ACK            (12) 
     | | NAMS SKR NAMS N             (13) 
     | | R SKNAMS R N             (14) 
     | | 'R NAMS ACK            (15) 
In words, the seven goals are: 
①  R believes that NAMS believes that Rpub is R’s public key; 
②  NAMS believes that R believes that NAMSpub is NAMS’s public key; 
③  NAMS believes that R believes that PCR is credible; 
④  R believes that NAMS believes that ACK is credible; 
⑤  R believes that NAMS believes that nonceNAMS-SK (NNAMS-SK) is credible; 
⑥  NAMS believes that R believes that nonceR-SK (NR-SK) is credible; 
⑦  R believes that NAMS believes that ACK’ is credible.  
The fourth goal is to prove that the platform authentication process is trusted. The seventh 
goal is to prove that the administrator authentication process is trusted. These two goals are the 
most important ones. 
3.3 Initialization assumption 
According to the characteristics of TNEAAP, this paper makes the following initialization 
assumptions: 
     | | pub
NAMS
R NAMS            (16) 
     | | ( ),NAMS NAMS NAMS SKR NAMS N nonce N        (17) 
     | | R SKNAMS R N            (18) 
     | #( , , )NAMS NAMS SK pubR N N R          (19) 
     | #( , )R SKNAMS PCR N           (20) 
     | | pub
R
NAMS R            (21) 
3.4 Analysis 
Logical Reasoning Process 1: 
    From the equation (2)we can derive: 
   NAMSR pub
NAMS
 || , 1{ , }NAMS NAMSR N R NAMS
     (22) 
We can infer the following: 
     | | , | | , | #( )NAMS pub pubR NAMS N R NAMS R R R       (23) 
Then, we draw the conclusion: 
     | | | pub
R
R NAMS R             (24) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 2: 
Similarly to reasoning process 1, from the equation (2) we can draw the conclusion. 
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    | | | pub
NAMS
NAMS R NAMS           (25) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 3: 
    From the equation (3), we can obtain 
    RNAMSRKsIDplatSMLRNPCRNAMS pub
R
NAMS 
 ||,}}_,,},{{{ 11   (26) 
We can then infer: 
    NAMSNAMSNAMSIDplatSMLRNPCRNAMS pub
NAMS
pubNAMS  
 ||,}_,,},{{ 1  (27) 
We can also infer: 
     RNAMSIDplatSMLRNPCRNAMS pub
R
NAMS 
 ||},_,,},{{ 1   (28) 
and 
     )(#|},,{|| PCRNAMSNPCRRNAMS NAMS      (29) 
 We draw the conclusion  
     NAMS R PCR | |           (30) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 4: 
    From the equation (4), we can infer: 
     RRRRRRNAMSR pub
R
succpubsucc  ||),(#|,}{||     (31) 
And draw the conclusion  
   | |R NAMS ACK            (32) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 5: 
    From the equation (6), we can infer: 
     | |~ { ,{ } }NAMS SK pubR NAMS SID N R  , and       (33) 
     | #( ), | pub
R
NAMS SKR N R R  |         (34) 
We draw the conclusion  
   | | NAMS SKR NAMS N             (35) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 6: 
Similarly to reasoning 5, we can draw the conclusion from the equation (7): 
     | | R SKNAMS R N             (36) 
 
Logical Reasoning Process 7:  
    From the equation (8), we can infer: 
     | | { '}R NAMS ACK R , and        (37) 
   | #( '), | | pub
R
R ACK R R            (38) 
And we draw a conclusion 
   | | 'R NAMS ACK            (39) 
3.5 Results 
 1) Although PCR, SML, platform ID, ACK, and ACK’ are not responsible for the 
authentication procedure directly, they are not redundant information. They are important for the 
security of the trusted network, and they play determinative roles in TNEAAP. We do not find 
redundant information in TNEAAP based on aforementioned analysis, thus it is a concise 
protocol. 
 2) In this method, seven security targets can be inferred from the messages of R and NAMS. 
Thus, TNEAAP is secure in BAN logic reasoning. 
 
4. THE SECURITY TESTING AND ANALYSIS OF TNEAAP 
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In this section, we use an experiment to further demonstrate the protocol is secure through an 
attacking detection method. The experiment should find defects of TNEAAP if there exists any. 
The protocol authentication processes are formalized using HLPSL [24] protocol description 
language. Then formalization of the protocol process is plugged into an attacking model of a 
safety testing tool. Finally the tool gives a conclusion whether TNEAAP can prevent the attack 
generated by the tool. 
4.1 Security targets 
In this section, we choose Dolev-Yao intruder model [25] for testing our protocol. In this 
model, an intruder controls the whole network and can perform any operations. The intruder can 
intercept, analyze, and revise all of messages. The intruder can pretend to be any agent and send 
disguised messages to anyone in the network. The attacker has the following knowledge and 
abilities: 
1) The attacker is familiar with encryption, decryption, hash, and other cryptographic operations. 
The attacker has its own public key and private key; 
2) The attacker has obtained the subject’s identifier and public key; 
3) The attacker has the knowledge and ability of cryptanalysis; 
4) The attacker can make various attacks, such as knowledge and ability of replay attacks. 
This is the strongest intruder model. If TNEAAP can meet the security goals under this 
intruder model, it proves the protocol can prevent all possible attacks from any attacker. 
In this experiment, we define 9 security goals: 
 1) The transportation process of PCR is confidential; 
 2) The transportation process of SML is confidential; 
 3) The transportation process of random number nonceNAMS is confidential; 
 4) The transportation process of session key random number nonceNAMS-SK is confidential; 
 5) The transportation process of session key random number nonceR-SK is confidential 
 6) The transportation process of the administrator’s password is confidential; 
 7) The transportation process of the administrator’s username is confidential; 
 8) The platform authentication success ACK is correct; 
 9) The user authentication success ACK’ is correct. 
 According to the above security goals, we use AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet 
Security Protocols and Applications) [26] network communication protocol security inspection 
system to test the security of our protocol. 
4.2 AVISPA 
AVISPA is a set of the establishment and analysis tools of security protocols [26]. It is one of 
the widest used protocols in the cryptography. As shown in Fig.3, it combines four types of 
analyses at backends: On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC), CL-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), 
SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), and Tree-Automata based Protocol Analyzer (TA4SP). The 
user first inputs the participants’ identification of protocol and then selects the running 
environment, goal, attacker ability variables. Finally, the user specifies the desired security 
properties in order to find whether there are problems in the protocol under test. The code written 
in HLPSL language is translated into IF (Intermediate Format) language through HLPSL2IF 
translation tools. Analysis of terminal AVISPA tool set can directly read IF language. It can 
analyze whether security goals are successful or not. If the protocol is unsafe, the analysis terminal 
will give us the attack track events.  
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On-the-fly 
Model-Checker 
OFMC
CL-based 
Attcak 
Searcher AtSe
SAT-based 
Model-Checker 
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Tree Automata-
based Protocol 
Analyser TA4SP
Translator HLPSL2IF
High-level Protocl Specification 
Language(HLPSL)
Intermediate Format(IF)
Output Format(OF)
 
Fig.3 Architecture of AVISPA 
4.3 Experiment process 
4.3.1 Basic roles 
In HLPSL, each participant is defined in a module separately, called basic role, which 
describes its initial state and its state transitions. We define two basic roles, as shown in Table 1: a 
network authentication manager server NAMS (a) and a Requester (r).  
 
Table 1 Definition of the basic roles 
Basic role Basic role configuration 
a role a (R, NAMS:agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) 
r role r (R, NAMS:agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) 
 
4.3.2 Security goals 
For evaluating the security properties of TNEAAP, we first formulize its security goals [27]. 
The specified equations are used to assess whether the goals are achieved or not. 
AVISPA defines different macros for formalizing the security goals. In our experiment, the 
macros are described as follow: 
1. Macro of information secrecy. T is the information produced by agent A. If T is a shared 
secret and is shared between agent A and a group of agents, B and C, the secrecy of information T 
is expressed as follows: 
Secret (T, t, A, B, C) 
where, t is the identification of the information T. 
2. Macro of strong authentication detection. This property is formalized using two macros as 
follows: 
Request (B, A, t, T) 
Witness (A, B, t, T) 
where, Request (B, A, t, T) indicates that agent B receives information T (identified by t) 
from agent A. Witness (A, B, t, T) indicates that agent A receives information T (identified by t) 
from agent B. 
For evaluating the security of TNEAAP, the following security goals are defined: 
1. Authentication of ACK and ACK’, where their process IDs are r_ack1 and r_ack2, 
respectively. We model this goal in HLPSL. 
Role r (R, NAMS: agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) 
Played_by R 
init State:=0 
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Transition: 
  State':=6/\request(R, NAMS, r_ack1') 
  State':=10/\request(R, NAMS, r_ack2') 
It means that R requests to check both ACK and ACK’. If the authentication is successful, R 
can obtain an acknowledge message. 
2. Check of the SK shared between NAMS and R. SK is only known by NAMS and R. 
Similar to SK, check of the PCR, SML, nonceNAMS, user_ID, user_PWD, nonceNAMS-SK and 
nonceR-SK are all needed. These goals are modeled in HLPSL as follows: 
Role a (R, NAMS: agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) 
Played_by NAMS 
init State:=0 
Transition: 
  State':=5/\request(PCR’, a_pcr, {R, NAMS}) 
/\request(SML’, a_sml, {R, NAMS}) 
/\request(Nonce1’, a_nonce1, {R, NAMS}) 
 State':=9/\request(User_id’, a_userid, {R, NAMS}) 
/\request(User_pwd’, a_userpwd, {R, NAMS}) 
/\request(Nonce3’, a_nonce3, {R, NAMS}) 
/\request(SK’,a_sk, {R, NAMS}) 
 Role r (R, NAMS: agent, Ka, Kr:public_key, SND, RCV:channel(dy)) 
Played_by R 
init State:=0 
  State':=8/\request(Nonce2’, a_nonce2, {R, NAMS}) 
In the model NAMS declares PCR, SML, nonceNAMS, user_ID, user_PWD, nonceR-SK and SK 
as the secrets, and R declares nonceNAMS-SK as a secret, where a_x stands for x’s process id. 
 
4.3.3 Session scenarios  
For the validation purpose, we define three different scenarios. First, we implement a single 
session with all the roles played by legitimate agents (Scenario 1). Then we test the situations in 
which the intruder would impersonate the network authentication manager server (Scenario 2) or 
the requester (Scenario 3). Table 2 lists the HLPSL definition of the sessions associated with each 
of the mentioned scenarios, where kx refers to the public key of x. 
 
Table 2 Summary of session configurations 
Scenario Session configuration 
Scenario 1 session(a, r, ka, kr) 
Scenario 2 session(a, i, ka, ki) 
Scenario 3 session(i, r, ki, kr) 
 
4.3.4 Experiment results 
The experiments are conducted based on the aforementioned model specification. For our 
verification, we have used OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to search for the attacks on the protocol. 
The test outputs of the experiment results are summarized in Table 3. The left column lists the 
output from the OFMC backend and the right column is from the CL-AtSe backend. 
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Table 3 Summary of test outputs from OFMC backend, and from CL-AtSe backend 
SUMMARY 
SAFE 
DETAILS 
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
PROTOCOL 
D:\NPLAB\temp\130401203137024905.if 
GOAL 
As_specified 
BACKEND 
OFMC 
COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
  parseTime: 0.00s 
  searchTime: 0.03s 
  visitedNodes: 4 nodes 
  depth: 2 plies 
SUMMARY 
SAFE 
DETAILS 
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS 
TYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
D:\NPLAB\temp\130401203858035709.if 
GOAL 
  As Specified 
BACKEND 
  CL-AtSe 
STATISTICS 
  Analysed   : 4 states 
  Reachable  : 4 states 
  Translation: 0.01 seconds 
  Computation: 0.00 seconds 
 
According to the summary results in Table 3, TNEAAP is safe in both OFMC and AtSe 
backends (Summary: SAFE), and no vulnerabilities in the proposed protocol. If some defects are 
detected, Summary will be UNSAFE. DETAILS section provides the information that an attack is 
found in the protocol specification. The IF form of the protocol resides in the path given under the 
PROTOCOL section of the output, with the file name, 130401203137024905.if. The GOAL section 
of output describes the result of the goal, which is written in the specitication for the verificaiton 
process. The backend that verifies the protocol specification is OFMC or CL-AtSe, which is given 
under the BACKEND. The STATISTICS gives us the time required to execute the protocol 
specification by the tool and the number of the visited nodes or states during the execution. 
For comparison, we have used OFMC and CL-AtSe backends to search for the attacks on the 
CHAP protocol. The test outputs of the experiment results are summarized in Table 4. The left 
column lists the output from the OFMC backend and the right column is from the CL-AtSe 
backend. 
Table 4 Summary of CHAP from OFMC backend, and from CL-AtSe backend 
SUMMARY 
  UNSAFE 
DETAILS 
  ATTACK_FOUND 
PROTOCOL 
  D:\NPLAB\temp\130570765157676751.if 
GOAL 
  secrecy_of_sec_kab1 
BACKEND 
  OFMC 
COMMENTS 
STATISTICS 
  parseTime: 0.00s 
  searchTime: 0.01s 
  visitedNodes: 1 nodes 
  depth: 1 plies 
ATTACK TRACE 
i -> (a,3): start 
(a,3) -> i: a 
i -> (a,3): x238 
(a,3) -> i: Na(2).h(kab.Na(2).x238.a) 
i -> (i,17): kab 
i -> (i,17): kab 
 
% Reached State: 
% % secret(kab,sec_kab1,set_61) 
SUMMARY 
  UNSAFE 
 
DETAILS 
  ATTACK_FOUND 
  TYPED_MODEL 
PROTOCOL 
  D:\NPLAB\temp\130570766808871194.if 
 
GOAL 
  Secrecy attack on (kab) 
 
BACKEND 
  CL-AtSe 
 
STATISTICS 
 
  Analysed   : 7 states 
  Reachable  : 7 states 
  Translation: 0.01 seconds 
  Computation: 0.00 seconds 
 
 
ATTACK TRACE 
 i -> (a,3):  start 
 (a,3) -> i:  a 
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% contains(a,set_61) 
% contains(b,set_61) 
% 
state_chap_Init(b,i,kbi,h,0,dummy_nonce,dummy_non
ce,set_77,9) 
% 
state_chap_Init(a,i,kai,h,0,dummy_nonce,dummy_non
ce,set_74,6) 
% state_chap_Init(a,b,kab,h,2,Na(2),x238,set_61,3) 
% 
state_chap_Resp(b,a,kab,h,0,dummy_nonce,dummy_n
once,set_69,3) 
% witness(a,b,na,Na(2)) 
 
 
 i -> (a,3):  Nb(2) 
 (a,3) -> i:  n2(Na).{kab.n2(Na).Nb(2).a}_h 
              & Secret(kab,set_61);  
Witness(a,b,na,n2(Na));  Add a to set_61; 
              & Add b to set_61; 
 
According to the summary results in Table 4, CHAP is unsafe in both OFMC and AtSe 
backends (Summary: UNSAFE), DETAILS section provides the information that a 
Man-in-the-middle attack is found in the protocol specification.  
 
5. NETWORK EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Like all security protocols, TNEAAP take extra steps to ensure the security of the network 
and its devices. This section evaluates the overhead of implementing TNEAAP from network 
equipment’s point of view. We take both storage and computation overheads into consideration. 
5.1 Storage overhead 
In TNEAAP, each requester has to store two keys permanently: the secret key SK and the 
NAMS’s public key NAMSpub. 
Additionally, each requester also needs to store two nonce values: nonceNAMS and 
nonceNAMS-SK. Considering the requesters that attempt to access a given node in a completely 
random basis at mean rate 1/T, the second step of authentication messages in equation (2) received 
by NAMS can be modelled as a Poisson processwith mean 1/T. For each authentication message 
received, NAMS stores a nonceNAMS, until it receives the fourth step of authentication message in 
equation (4) from NAMS or until a timer set to TLifetime expires. Suppose that the TLifetime has an 
upper bound and is reached whenever a packet is lost, assuming a packet loss probability of the 
network is P, the average number of nonceNAMS that the requester must store is given by equation 
(40), where TACK denotes the average time elapsed between the reception of an equation (2) 
message and its corresponding equation (4) message. We assume that the storage overhead of 
nonceNAMS and nonceNAMS-SK is the same. Therefore, the requester storage overhead is  
    




 )1(
11
overhead Storage PT
T
PT
T
N ACKLifetime
      (40) 
 
As an example, we set TACK= 10s, TLifetime= 2TACK= 20s, and T=5min. Fig. 4 shows 
overheads incurred from 5, 10, and 50 requesters, with an increasing packet loss probability. As 
can be seen in the figure, the average number of nonceNAMS and nonceNAMS-SK that NAMS stores is 
small. It implies that NAMS does not need to have a large buffer to maintain the nonce values. 
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Fig.4 Storage overhead  
5.2 Computation overhead 
The overall computational overhead incurred by TNEAAP is a fixed number. The individual 
overheads are from equation (3) and equation (7). Table 5 summarizes the individual overheads in 
NEAAP for each type of requesters. 
 
Table 5 Computational overhead of cryptographic operations in equation (3) and equation (7) 
Type of operation equation (3) 
(calculation times) 
equation (7) 
(calculation times) 
Symmetric key encryption 0 1 
Symmetric key decryption 0 0 
Asymmetric key encryption 1 1 
Asymmetric key decryption 2 1 
MAC 0 1 
5.3 Comparison with other authentication protocols 
Now we compare the capacity and overhead of TNEAAP with that of the other security 
protocols. The results are summarized in Table 6. As shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, for 50 requesters, 
our method does not need to have a large buffer to maintain nonce values, and computational 
overhead is similar to the other protocols. However, TNEAAP supports more security functions, 
including both authentication capability and authorization capability, which ensure the credibility 
of the network system is strong. 
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Table 6 Comparison with other protocols 
 Kerberos [29] LEAP [30] 
SPINS-based 
Protocol [31] 
TNEAAP 
authentication 
capability 
yes no yes yes 
authorization 
capability 
no 
two levels: legitimate 
member of thesensor 
network or attacker 
no yes 
storage cost 1 symmetric key 
1 symmetric key + 
identitiesof neighboring 
nodes 
1 symmetric 
key 
1 public key 
+1symmetric 
key+2 nonce 
computation 
overhead 
1 encryption + 2 
decryption 
1 MAC+ 1 pseudo-random 
function 
1 decryption 
+ 2 MAC 
2 encryption+1 
decryption+1 
MAC 
Support trusted 
module 
no no no yes 
 
Fig.5 Comparison curve of storage overhead at n=50 
 
Fig.6 Comparison curve of computation overhead at n=50 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
Current trusted network access authentication research pays major attentions to the terminals, 
and thus the TNC (Trusted Network Connection) does not have an authentication protocol for 
network devices accessing. In this paper, we developed the TNEAAP protocol, which is more 
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suitable for network equipment, more secure, and more reliable, due to the development of 
additional mechanism for the equipment’s platform authentication.  
In the study of TNEAAP, we theoretically and experimentally verified three issues: (1) 
TNEAAP does not contain any unnecessary information. We analyzed the redundant information 
by BAN logical system. The results show that the protocol is a concise protocol. (2) The protocol 
is security in theory. The BAN logic safety analysis has proved TNEAAP is safe and reliable. (3) 
The protocol is secure in experiment. We tested the protocol under the strongest attack model in 
our experiments. The nine goals which decided the protocol’s security have been achieved in the 
attack model.  
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